| Approved For Release <b>100 P</b> /27 <b>S GCR 12</b> 9 00975A00360036000   | 1-2  |
|---|--|
| 25X1  |  |
| 11 April 19   | 958 25X1   |
| Copy No.  | 140  |
|   | 140  |
| CENTRAL   |  |
| INTELLIGEN  |  |
| IINILLLIULI   |  |
|   | ,  |
| BULLETIN  |  |
|   |  |
|   |  |
| EX TELLIGENCE TO THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY | 25X1   |
| DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS.  | And the second s |
| CLASS. CHANCED TO: TS NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: NB 706  | <b>6010</b> 25X1   |
| DATE 3/13/80 REVIEWER   |  |
|   |  |
| State Dept. review completed  |  |
|   | 1  |

TOP SECRET



# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

11 April 1958

| 25X1       | DAILY BRIEF   |       |
|------------|---|-------|
|            | I, THE COMMUNIST BLOC   | ·     |
| no         | USSR - Summit tactics: On 9 April Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov gave Ambassador Thompson an official reply to the 31 March Western proposals, but almost immediately withdrew it following a sudden telephone call. The note appeared to propose that the ambassadors in Moscow discuss only such arrangements for a foreign ministers' meeting as time, place, and composition. The confusion may have been caused by the fact that Premier Khrushchev was to return to Moscow the next day. Kuznetsov reiterated orally that the USSR thought the West wanted preliminary negotiations in order to reach an impasse and prevent a summit conference, while Moscow thought a summit meeting would be useful whether or not it could reach decisions. | 25X1A |
| 25X1A      | be useful whether of not it could reach decisions.  | 25/1/ |
| NO<br>25X1 | Hungary - USSR: The cold reception accorded Khrushchev on his Hungarian visit must have shattered his belief that the scars of the 1956 Soviet intervention could be removed by his personal magnetism. He had earlier told UN Secretary General Hammarskjold that he felt confident his trip would show he was not unpopular in Hungary. The alternately threatening and defensive tone of his 8 and 9 April speeches contrasts with his initial approach, which was more temperate and controlled, and suggests that the indifference of the Hungarians was an important factor in his loss of temper.  | 25X1A |
| ´          |   |       |
|            | i   |       |
|            | 25X1A   |       |

|    |     | Approved For Rel | ea <mark>\$6<sup>5</sup>2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79</mark>                            | <del>10097</del> 5 <b>40</b> 03600360001-2 |       |
|----|-----|------------------|--|--|-------|
|    |     |                  |  |  |       |
| X1 |     |                  |  |  |       |
|    |     |                  |  |  |       |
|    |     |                  |  |  |       |
|    |     |                  |  |  |       |
|    |     | Conict flo       | harry and the mile of the  |  |       |
|    |     | practice flight  | by practice: The Soviet<br>s over Moscow in prepar-<br>ture of the Soviet May Da | ration for the flyby                       |       |
|    | Two | So far only kn   | own types of Soviet fighter<br>erved. At least seven ca                          | er and bomber aircraf                      | ť     |
|    | 100 | have been note   | ed on trailers in Moscow<br>such as occurred in Mos                              | , suggesting that a mi                     |       |
|    |     | probably will    | pe repeated.   |  | 25X1A |
|    |     |                  |  |  |       |
|    |     |                  |  |  |       |
|    | 140 |                  |  |  |       |
|    |     |                  |  |  |       |
|    |     |                  |  |  |       |
|    |     | 25X1A            | II. ASIA-AFRICA  |  |       |
| (1 |     |                  |  |  |       |
|    |     |                  |  |  |       |
|    |     |                  |  |  |       |
|    |     |                  |  |  |       |
|    |     | 11 Apr 58        | DAILY BRIEF  | ii   |       |
|    |     |                  | 25X1A  | $\neg$                                     |       |
|    |     |                  |  |  |       |

| 25X1A |              |   |  |   |          |
|-------|--------------|---|--|---|----------|
|       | 6.K<br>25X1A | ances that any will not receive granted the right ernment, hower flag when the meanwhile, ha          | Taiwan: Taipei has accept Chinese Communist trave official status or priviple of the fly Peiping's flag. ever, cannot legally prepeiping mission opens. ave announced that trade wan will soon return to respect to the communication of the flag of t | de delegation in Tokyo ileges or be formally The Japanese Gov- vent the flying of the The Nationalists, relations between   | 25X1A    |
|       | no           | has stated that South Korea as Agreement to Korea's promiuhich Seoul hawill undoubted until the issue | outh Korea: The Japanes t formal talks for an ove re "practically certain" convene the conference s se to repatriate Japanes as indicated it will under ly continue to hold some of the return of Korean a is settled. This will c   | r-all settlement with<br>to open on 15 April.<br>still depends on South<br>e fishermen, an action<br>take. Seoul, however,<br>Japanese as hostages,<br>detainees in Japan |          |
| 25X   | 1A [         | <u>which are</u> like   | ly to be difficult in any cage 5)  | ase.  | 25X<br>] |
|       |              |   |  |   |          |
|       |              |   |  | :   |          |
| PH    |              | 11 Apr. 58  |  | ·   |          |

|       | III. THE WEST  |        |
|-------|--|--------|
|       | France-Tunisia: Gaillard appears determined to reject the US-UK good offices proposals for reopening French- | :<br>: |
|       | Tunisian negotiations because of Bourguiba's refusal to ac-  | ;      |
|       | cept neutral supervision of both sides of the Algerian-Tunisian  |        |
|       | border. Gaillard regards this proposal as politically unac-  |        |
| 140   | ceptable in France, and his view will probably be confirmed  |        |
|       | by the emergency session of the Council of Ministers on 11   |        |
|       | April. France may then initiate a new appeal to the UN Secu-   |        |
|       | rity Council to outmaneuver Bourguiba, who intends to raise  |        |
|       | the whole North African problemincluding Algeriafor UN   |        |
| 25X1A | review.  |        |
|       |  |        |
|       | Cuba: Despite its failure in Havana, the Castro strike   |        |
|       | attempt seems to be partially effective in Santiago and to   | ,      |
| NO.   | have spread to other towns in Oriente Province as well as  | 25V1A  |
| ·     | to Camaguey Province. Thus limited, however, it poses  | 25X1A  |
|       | no threat to Batista's control at this time.   |        |

11 Apr 58

DAILY BRIEF

iv

25X1A

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

## Rift Between Taipei and Tokyo Temporarily Eased

The rift between Japan and Nationalist China over the right of the proposed Peiping trade delegation to fly the Chinese Communist flag in Tokyo has been settled for the moment. A Chinese Nationalist communiqué cites Japanese assurances that any Chinese Communist trade agency established in Tokyo will be denied official status and privileges, and that Japan "will not recognize the right of the Chinese Communists to fly their flag." The communiqué expresses Taipei's belief that Tokyo will "in time give practical expression" to these assurances.

The Nationalists have also announced that trade relations between the two countries—restricted by the Nationalists on 18 March when trade contracts with Japanese suppliers were suspended—will return to normal on 10 April when the Bank of Taiwan resumes the issuance of letters of credit to local merchants for the purchase of Japanese goods. Negotiations for a trade agreement probably will also be resumed.

While Tokyo maintains that it has no legal basis to

| prevent the flying of foreign flags, it seems quite unlikely that Taipei has surrendered on this point. Taipei's acquiescence could be the result of some confidential understanding that Japan will find a means to take the necessary action. | 25X6 |
|---|------|
|   |      |
| ·   | 25X1 |
|   |      |

11 Apr 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4

25X1A

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003600360001-2

25X6

| Approved For | Relea 25 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T0097 | <u>75<del>/10</del></u> 03600360001-2 |
|--------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
|              |                                      |                                       |

### Japan and South Korea Prepared to Resume Format Negotiations

The South Korean vice foreign minister told an official of the American Embassy on 9 April that his government can give Japanese Prime Minister Kishi private assurances on the repatriation of Japanese fishermen detained at Pusan which will open the way for talks to normalize relations. The Japanese Foreign Ministry has indicated that details for the mutual release of detainees are still under discussion, but that negotiations are "practically certain" to open on 15 April.

Japanese Foreign Minister Fujiyama believes that Seoul might return about 300 of 422 detained fishermen, holding the remainder as hostages to assure the return to South Korea of some 90 Koreans in Japan who have requested repatriation to Pyongyang. The Japanese Government apparently is willing to accept such an arrangement in order to show some progress in negotiations prior to the national election campaign expected in May.

Plans to open the negotiations on 1 March broke down when Seoul refused to continue the repatriation of fishermen unless Japan guaranteed to repatriate all Korean illegal residents to South Korea including the 90 desiring to go to North Korea. Lack of agreement on the disposition of the 90 probably will be a serious obstacle in the forthcoming discussions.

Should this hurdle be overcome, the negotiations may lead to an early agreement on such outstanding issues as property claims, but a compromise on the controversial

25X1

| 25X1A | Rhee line which bans Japanese fishing in waters as much as 60 miles from the Korean coast will probably prove more difficult. |  |   |  |  |
|-------|---|--|---|--|--|
|       |   |  |   |  |  |
|       | 25X1A   |  | J |  |  |
|       | 11 4 50   | CENTRAL INTELLICENCE BUILDETING TO THE |   |  |  |

11 Apr 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page

| 25X1A          |   |              |
|----------------|---|--------------|
| Approved For I | Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00 | 3600360001-2 |

#### III. THE WEST

## France Uncompromising on Tunisian Border Supervision

French Premier Gaillard and Foreign Minister Pineau told the US-UK good offices mission on 9 April that they doubt their government could accept the mission's proposals of 15 March on reopening French-Tunisian negotiations, because of Tunisian President Bourguiba's unwillingness to agree to any provision for neutral supervision of both sides of the Algerian border. Gaillard, who regards the proposals as politically unacceptable in France, probably can expect the 11 April emergency session of the French Council of Ministers to back his adamant position. Pineau, meanwhile, has already told the National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee that the good offices mission has failed.

Both Gaillard and Pineau showed interest in a suggestion by British Ambassador Jebb that France couple assent to the Tunisian minimum conditions with a proposal to the UN Security Council to set up a border commission on both sides of the frontier. Since such a move would probably encounter rightist opposition, however, France may prefer to renew its February appeal to the UN Security Council in an effort to outmaneuver Bourguiba. The Tunisian President intends not only to press his own February complaint against France in the Security Council but also to open up the question of Algeria and the entire North African problem for UN review.

France will not hesitate to use its veto power if the Security Council moves to include Algeria in its discussion following the report of the good offices mission. Such a step would almost certainly lead to a strong drive by the Arab-Asian bloc for a special session of the General Assembly.

25X1A

25X1A

25X1

11 Apr 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

11 April 1958

## DAILY BRIEF

| 5X1 |  | palantinž,<br>s |     |
|-----|--|-----------------|-----|
|     |  |                 |     |
|     | Soviet flyby practice: The Soviet Air Force has started practice flights over Moscow in preparation for the flyby which is a feature of the Soviet May Day parade in Red Square. So far only known types of Soviet fighter and bomber aircraft have been observed. At least seven canvas-covered missiles have been noted on trailers in Moscow, suggesting that a missile display-such as occurred in Moscow last November-probably will be repeated. | 25X1A           |     |
|     |  |                 | 25) |
|     | Cuba: Despite its failure in Havana, the Castro strike attempt seems to be partially effective in Santiago and to have spread to other towns in Oriente Province as well as to Camaguey Province. Thus limited, however, it poses no threat to Batista's control at this time.   |                 | ¥   |

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003600360001-2

X1